needed for individuation because no other entity can ground individuation as deeply.
The problem of individuation is usually stated in the following way. Consider two spots, presented simultaneously, which have the same color, same size, the same shape and so on; in other words, two spots, which have all their nonrelational qualities in common. The spots are two and not one. The problem is to ontologically ground this twoness or numerical diversity of the spots. To demand such a ground is to ask for an ontological analysis of a thing1 (a list of its simple constituents) which contains for any two things, at least one constituent in which they differ. To illustrate, suppose we represent the analysis of a thing by a list of its constituents in brackets, e.g.,
(f,,. ,f,,). Then the numerical diversity of two things, A and B is grounded if there is an element on the list associated with A which
is not an element on the list associated with B, e.g., (ftl. . .,f. ..,fn), (f, ... ,fi... f,,) 2 An analysis of things which introduces particulars to solve the individuation problem is the particular-universal analysis. According to it an ordinary thing consists of a bare particular joined to universals ' I shall use "ordinary thing" and "thing" as equivalent expressions. 2 In a recent paper Hector-Neri Castaieda argues that the problem I have described is the problem of individual differentiation and not the problem of individuation. For him, the problem of individuation consists in "describ[ing] that ingredient or structure in Nous-A that makes Nous-A an individual, i.e., constitutes the individuality of Nous-A " ([5] p. 132). I agree that there are two problems here, but their difference makes no difference to the argument of my paper because on both analyses to be discussed the entity used to differentiate is also used to individuate.
Besides his own view of individuation, the most important contribution made by Castafieda in his paper is both his formulation of and his arguments supporting the formulation of seven criteria for a fully satisfactory solution to the problem of individuation. The last four criteria are particularly important. They are: by the ontological tie (nexus) of exemplification. Thus the analysis of an ordinary thing, say, a red round ball, would consist of certain universals, a particular and exemplification. If a quality can be "in" more than one thing, it is a universal. If, on the other hand, it can be "in" only one thing, it is a (perfect) particular. Both the particularuniversal and the alternative "Bundle" analysis construe qualities as universals. In the particular-universal analysis, the diversity of two things is accounted for by the analysis of each containing a different particular. In this analysis, particulars ground the numerical diversity of things. And it is argued that they can do this because it is "impossible" for a bare particular to be "in" more than one thing.
An As the locution is used, a bare particular is just that entity which is a constituent of one and only one ordinary thing. Thus it accounts for the difference between any one ordinary thing and all others. Hausman is maintaining that it is merely impossible3, i.e., false a priori, for a positional quality to be "in" two or more discrete things (at the same time) while it is impossible, for a bare particular to be "in" two or more discrete objects. Bergmann calls attention to the same distinction concerning these two solutions to the individuation problem:
It is impossible, for a bare particular to be "in" more than one ordinary thing. That is their particularity. For a coordinate quality, we remember, it is merely impossible3 to be "in" more than one thing. That is a rather striking difference between these two solutions to the individuation problem. The second grounds individuality more deeply (a priori false versus ill-formed) ([2], p. 24).
Thus, Bergmann and Hausman in opting for bare particulars, are, at least implicitly, maintaining that the ground of individuation or, synonymously, particularity, must be categorial, i.e., in the formation rules of an improved language. To ground particularity merely in the laws of the synthetic a priori would not be deep enough. But then, positional qualities cannot provide a ground of individuation because it is not categorially (nor logically) impossible for two ordinary objects to have literally the same place as a constituent.
However, the requirement that the ground of individuation must be such that it is categorially impossible for two objects to share it is much too strong. Moreover, it cannot even be satisfied by bare particulars. Consider the following question: "Why cannot a bare particular be a constituent of more than one ordinary thing?" Bergmann and Hausman reply by maintaining that the state of affairs depicted by an expression that would assert that two ordinary things contain the same particular would be categorially impossible. They would say that in their IL the same particular being in more than one ordinary thing would have to be represented by an ill-formed expression and so could not depict a possible state of affairs. This answer will not suffice, for they cannot claim with regard to any expression about an ordinary thing that it is ill-formed since in their IL there are no ordinary things. There are signs for particulars, qualities, facts, etc., but there are no signs or sequences of signs that represent ordinary things. For, that in the analysis which corresponds to a temporal cross-section of an ordinary thing is not itself a thing but a fact. The point is, since Bergmann and Hausman explicate the notion of categorial impossibility in terms of ill-formedness of expression in the IL, and since they have no expression in the IL to represent an ordinary thing, they cannot maintain that it is categorially impossible for either a particular to be in more than one thing, or for a particular to be in one and only one thing. They cannot show that any expression about ordinary things is ill-formed or well-formed since on their analysis there are no ordinary things.
A critic may think that the above argument may be undermined simply by noting that some unusual expressions for ordinary things are to be found in any philosopher's formal language, including Bergmann's. This reply, however, misses my point. I said that the claim that "a bare particular cannot be a constituent of more than one ordinary thing" cannot be a categorial truth. My reason is that while there is just about everything else in Bergmann's ontology there are no ordinary things. Thus I cannot see how either the statement "a bare particular cannot be in more than one ordinary thing" or its converse "more than one ordinary thing cannot contain one bare particular" can be a categorial truth. How can there be a categorial truth about something that does not belong to any category?
My 
A critic might respond to this argument by claiming that it rests on my failure to see that individual constants are to be interpreted syncategorematically. To see what is involved in this objection we must first determine what is meant by the term 'syncategorematic.' One meaning of 'syncategorematic' is explicated by Bergmann (cf. [3]). Consider the well-formed sentence (sequence of signs) f,(a).
In that expression, 'f,' names a property, 'a' names an individual, and the juxtaposition (spatial arrangement) of the individual and property sign show that the individual exemplifies the property. Exemplification is thought of as a syncategorematic entity because there is no primitive sign that names it. More generally, to interpret something syncategorematically is to deny that it has a name in the language, and to assert that the syntax (geometrical arrangement of the signs) of the language shows that is is a feature of reality. The critic notes that by a synthetic a priori law, the conjunction of the two propositions is false. However, he says that it does not matter whether we say that Proposition 1 is true and the other false or that Proposition 2 is true and the other false. In other words, signs for bare particulars are syncategorematic. That is, 'a' and 'b' do not denote any specific bare particular; they merely signify that there are two bare particulars involved and that while each sign stands for one of them, it can stand for either of them. Because of the syncategorematic character of signs for particulars it follows, according to the critic, that it is categorially impossible for the Bergmann-Hausman IL to have expressions which purport to represent the same bare particular in two ordinary things.
The critic's argument is invalid, but it is interesting because it lends support to my thesis that we cannot reject the positional qualities because they do not ground individuation as deeply as bare particulars. The argument is invalid because the syncategorematic interpretation of signs for bare particulars requires the use of interpretation rules. It is true that these rules are nonspecific, i.e., 'a' and 'b' do not denote any specific entity, but rather some entity or another from the class of particulars. But even the use of nonspecific interpretation rules would preclude the ground of individuation being categorial (i.e., syntactical). Furthermore, the argument is invalid because the syncategorematic interpretation does not eliminate expressions purporting to represent the same particular in two things. For, assuming Propositions 1 and 2 are true, and assuming the syncategorematic interpretation of 'a' and 'b', we still have two well-formed expressions. Thus, even on the syncategorematic interpretation of individual constants a single bare particular being "in" more than one ordinary thing is not categorially impossible.
This observation leads us back to our original question: "Why cannot a bare particular be "in" more than one ordinary thing?" Or, to put the question in terms of our possible universe: "Why cannot Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 both be true representations of a universe consisting of two spots?" The critic supplies us with the answer for he says that by a synthetic a priori law, the conjunction of the two propositions is false. That is, it is impossible3 for a particular to be in two ordinary things. But then, positional qualities cannot be rejected as individuators because they do not ground individuality as deeply as is required. For they ground individuality in a sense as fundamental as the sense in which particulars do, namely, in the laws of the synthetic a priori.
The preceding arguments have assumed that categorial impossibility is to be explicated in terms of formation rules and that the latter are purely syntactical. Perhaps this assumption is mistaken and we ought to include both semantical (interpretation) and syntactical rules in the notion of well-formedness. In other words, suppose the formation rules are to include the rule that syntactically primitive individual constants are also semantically primitive, i. Bergmann accepts the principle of acquaintance. This principle reflects the idea that the simple elements of an ontology must be entities with which we are acquainted. Since, according to Bergmann, bare particulars do, and coordinate qualities (i.e., positional qualities) do not satisfy this requirement, the former are superior to the latter.
Arguments from acquaintance are difficult at best.7 Goodman even gives an argument that we are acquainted with positional qualities:
. . to say a concretum is located at the center of the visual field is quite as positive as to say that is has a certain red color; arbitrary referents are no more needed in the former case than in the latter. It is true that while we have a number of different color names we have a few non-relative terms for spatial position. But this is largely because the phenomenal positions of ordinary things change so rapidly and so continually that we are seldom practically concerned with other than relative objective location ([6], p. 196).
Goodman, like Russell, is maintaining that location in the visual field is as positive a visual quality as, say, the color green. And it does seem that given a succession of phenomena, one can recognize that a patch is in the same part of the visual field as a previous one just as one can recognize that it is the same color as the previous one. Hence, an appeal to acquaintance cannot be used to establish the superiority of the bare particular view.
Within the frameworks considered, Bergmann and Hausman have not established that the bare particular solution to the problem of individuation is either dialectically more profound or epistemologically more preferable than the positional quality solution. I conclude, therefore, that they have not proved that particulars are necessary and that positional qualities are insufficient for individuation. 8 
